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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 14181 
. 
WILBURN D. HELM and MARIE L. 
HELM, his wife; THERESA 
DAMBROSI; UINTAH OIL 
REFINING COMPANY; and CENTRAL 
BANK & TRUST, : 
Defendants-Respondents 
oooOooo 
BRIEF OF RESPONDANT 
UINTA OIL REFINING COMPANY 
oooOooo 
STATE.MENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action in condemnation by the State Road 
Commission to acquire real property for the widening of 
West 3500 South. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried to a jury for three days in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Judge Gordon Hall presiding. 
A verdict was returned in the amount of $34,000.00 for the 
"taking" and $16,983.00 severance damages, for a total damages of 
$50,983.00. Of the total, $14,000.00 was awarded respondant 
Uinta Oil Refining Company as lessee of certain of the real 
property condemned. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondant Uinta Oil Refining Company seeks affirmance 
of the judgment on the verdict in its favor and an award of 
costs for this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff Road Commission condemned a portion of real 
property owned by the Defendants Wilburn D. Helm, Marie L. 
Helm and Theresa Dambrosi (hereinafter the "fee owners") on 
the south-west corner of 3500 South and 1400 West in Salt 
Lake County. The Defendant Uinta Oil Refining Company (herein-
after "Uinta" or the "leaseholder") had a lease on a portion 
of the property condemned measuring 175 feet along 3500 South 
and 173 feet in depth. This lease commenced on January 1, 1972, 
and ran until December 31, 1982. (Exs. 7, 8, 9). The rent 
payable on the lease was $250.00 per month to the end of the 
lease. (Tr. 15). At the time of condemnation on April 30, 1974, 
the lease had 8 years and 8 months to run. 
The General Manager of Uinta, W. B. Robins, who has evaluatec 
properties for leasing since 1937 for the operation of service 
stations, testified that the economic or market value of Uinta's 
lease on the date of condemnation, April 30, 1974, taking 
into account the then condition of the property, was $650.00 
per month. (Tr. 34, 21, 22, .54). " 
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Another witness, James E. Ashton, who has spent a 
lifetime in evaluating and acquiring new sites for service 
station operations, testified that the economic value of Uinta 
Oil's lease as of the date of condemnation, April 30, 1974, 
was $500.00 per month. 
Another expert, Frank K. Stuart, a CPA and an economist, 
who has expertise in mathematics, accounting, and economic 
theory, testified that the discounted value on April 30, 1974, 
of $400.00 per month for the 8 years and 8 months remaining 
on the lease was $32,145.78. (Tr. 201). The $400.00 per 
month being the difference between the "contract rent" of 
$250.00 and an "economic rent" of $650.00 testified to by 
Mr. Robins. This difference is often referred to as the "bonus 
rent". Taking Mr. Ashton1s smaller figure for economic rent of 
$500.00 per month, Mr. Stuart calculated the resultant $250.00 
bonus rent ($500.00 less contract rent of $250.00) to have 
a discounted value for the remaining term of the lease of $20,911. 
(Tr. 199). This court has approved this method of valuing the 
lessee's interest. State of Utah v. W. Roy Brown, et al., 
Utah 2d , 531 P.2d 1294 (1975). 
The jury was properly instructed that the valuation date 
was the date of condemnation, April 30, 1974. (R. 117, 125, 
127, 128, 130). After approximately four hours of deliberation 
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(Tr. 321, 327), the jury returned a verdict of $14,000.00 
in favor of Uinta as part of the total verdict it rendered 




THE PROPERTY VALUATIONS WERE MADE AS OF THE DATE OF 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS, APRIL 30, 1974. THE STATE'S 
CONTENTION TO THE CONTRARY IS ABSURD. 
All the testimony at trial regarding the value of the 
property was as of April 30, 1974, the date of service of 
summons. Mr. Robins testified on direct examination that 
the value of the lease as of April, 1974, the date of 
condemnation, was $650.00 per month. (Tr. 21-22, 33-34). 
When cross examined by Mr. Ward, the State's attorney, 
Robins confirmed the use of that date: 
Q. I am talking about your valuation, is that 
what you testified to in direct examination? 
A. My valuation was based upon the April, 1974 
date, yes, sir. (Tr. 54). 
Mr. Ashton used the same date. 
Q. Now, based upon the evaluation that you have 
just described and upon the experience you have 
had, do you have an opinion as to the value of 
the sublease on this property that was held by 
Uinta Oil Refining .Company as of June 30, 1974? 
A. Yes. 
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THE COURT: You mean, April 30th, 1974? 
MR. WRIGHT: Excuse me, April 30th, 1974. 
A. Yes. 
• • • 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. My opinion is that the lease of that station 
would be $500.00 a month. 
Plaintifffs expert accountant-economist, Mr. Stuart, used 
the same date, April 30, 1974, for his calculations. (Tr. 199, 
201). 
The jury was instructed in the court's charge to 
value the property as of April 30, 1974. (R. 117, 125, 127, 128, 
130). 
Appellant in its brief on Page 4, states: "The 
parties were in agreement that the date of valuation was on 
the date of the service of summons which was on or about April 
30, 1974". How then does the Appellant on Page 2 of its 
brief under RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL state: "[A]lso sought is 
a determination by the Supreme Court of Utah that the value of 
property sought to be acquired by eminent domain is determined 
by its value on the date on which there is service of summons"? 
No date other than the April 30, 1974 date was ever used in 
valuing the property. 
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However, during the direct examination of Mr. Robins, 
the State was allowed to introduce a photograph showing that 
as of the date of condemnation, the property was not being 
operated as a service station. Therefore, on direct examination, 
Mr. Robins was asked to explain why the property was not being 
so used on that date. This explanation was necessary for the 
jury to be fairly informed because the property was valued 
by all of Uinta's witnesses, as well as those of the fee owners 
and of the State, as a service station property. Apparently 
it is this explanation which Plaintiff claims was not admissable. 
The law has long been established in this state that 
all factors bearing upon value that a prudent purchaser would 
take into account should be given consideration, including 
any potential development reasonably to be expected. State 
of Utah, by and through its Road Commissioner v. Wooley, et ux., 
15 Utah 2nd 248, 399 P.2d 860 (1964); Weber Basin Water Conservanc 
District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959). Uinta 
was entitled to explain why, since the property was being 
valued as service station property, it was not being so operated 
on the date of condemnation. Any reasonable explanation was 
admissable under the cases just cited. Merely because the 
reason given was because the fact that the property was going 
to be condemned became known and made it impossible to find an 
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operator, did not make the explanation inadmissable. Surely 
the State canft claim that any factor reasonably affecting 
the potential use of the property is admissable, except if 
the controlling factor involves the State of Utah. 
As conclusively shown above, the property was valued 
in its then condition as of the date of service of summons. 
No claim was ever made for damages which may have occurred 
by reason of the threat of condemnation. No claim was ever 
made for a decrease in value of the property from the time the 
service station was closed in 1970 to the date of condemnation 
in 1974. The rule of State v. Bettilyon, 17 Utah 2d 135, 
405 P.2d 420 (1965), cited in plaintiff's brief, was applied 
by the trial court and strictly followed. Mr. Robins1 testimony 
did not vary that rule in the slightest. All it did was 
merely explain why the station was not operating when the 
property was condemned. There was no error in admitting this 
testimony. 
POINT TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ADMIT INTO 
EVIDENCE THE GALLONAGE REPORT OF THE STATION ON THE 
PROPERTY COVERING A TIME PERIOD WHICH ENDED FOUR 
YEARS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF CONDEMNATION. 
The trial court properly kept out of evidence the 
out-dated gallonage report of the station on the subject property 
which was closed four years prior to condemnation. The date 
was simply too remote to have any probative value. Furthermore, 
it was obtained by the State from Uinta pursuant to settlement 
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negotiations. Plaintiff's claim that it should have been 
admitted because the defendant's expert valuation witness 
testified about some high gallonage figures which the State had 
a right to rebut, is likewise ill founded- On direct 
examination, each of the defendant's expert witnesses who 
gave an opinion of value, gave the factors considered by them 
in giving their opinion. None even mentioned the out-dated 
gallonage figures. On cross examination by the State, however, 
without even attempting to establish that those figures were 
relied upon by the experts, Mr. Ward asked what these figures 
were. Over objection by defendant's counsel that these figures 
were immaterial, Mr. Ward pursued the matter with Mr. Ashton 
and got a response that he remembered one month's volume of 65,000 
gallons (Tr. 123). On cross examination, Mr. Harding testified 
he didn't concern himself with these figures because the 
station had been closed but remembered a high figure of 66,000 
gallons per month (Tr. 173). The factors given on direct 
examination by these witnesses in determining their opinion 
of value did not include these out-dated gallonage figures. The 
state failed to establish anything to the contrary. The State's 
claim now that it should have been able to rebut the immaterial 
evidence, which it intentionally put in the record on cross 
examination, should be rejected out of hand. The State's claim 
that it should have been allowed in closing argument to comment 
on the defendant's failure to put into evidence these immaterial, 
out-dated figures should also be summarily rejected. As plaintiff 
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points out at length in its brief, the valuation date is 
April 30, 1974, not four years earlier. 
POINT THREE 
ALL ERROR COMPLAINED OF BY PLAINTIFF, IF ERROR 
AT ALL, WAS HARMLESS AND DOES NOT JUSTIFY REVERSAL. 
As demonstrated above, Uinta strongly contends that 
no error occurred with respect to the admission of Mr. Robins1 
explanation why the station was not operating on the date of 
condemnation nor by the rejection of the out-dated gallonage 
summary, Exhibit 13-P. Plaintiff's claim that this court 
should reverse the judgment because the trial court admitted 
photographs of the service station being demolished (Exs. 3.7, 
3.8, 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11) is also without merit. Surely, the 
fee owner defendants had the right to demonstrate visually 
a fact that the state admitted, that the station had been 
completely torn down. This fact had a definite effect on 
severance damages. 
However, should this court for some reason determine 
that any of the trial court's actions complained of were error, 
none constitute sufficient error to grant a reversal of 
the judgment on the jury verdict. This court has repeatedly 
held that where a trial has been afforded, a presumption arises 
that the judgment should not be disturbed unless the appellant 
meets the burden of showing error substantial and prejudicial 
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in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that 
the result would have been different in the absence of such 
error. Simpson v. General Motors, 24 Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 
399 (1970); Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 
(1966); Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397 
P.2d 990 (1964). No such error has been shown here. The 
testimony and the instructions clearly demonstrate that the 
property was valued as of the date all parties acknowledge 
was proper - April 30, 1974. The jury was so instructed. No 
witness valued the property based upon, in part or whole, the 
out-dated 1970 gallonage figures. What the station may have 
pumped four years before condemnation is far too remote in 
time to be relevant, especially with the changing traffic 
pattern and traffic counts about which testimony was given. 
(Tr. 94). The State stipulated that the station was demolished. 
Seeing a picture of the same could not constitute reversable 
error under the standards set forth in the Simpson, Hall, and 
Rivas cases cited above. 
A survey of the entire record clearly reveals that Plaintiff 
had a fair opportunity to present its claims to the court and 
the jury for determination. There is, therefore, a presumption in 
favor of the verity of the verdict and judgment, including all 
aspects of the conduct of the proceedings and rulings of the 
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court. Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of showing that 
there was substantial and prejudicial error to overcome that 
presumption. 
CONCLUSION 
Nothing complained of by the Plaintiff constitutes 
error by the trial court. In any event, the Plaintiff has 
entirely failed in its burden of showing prejudicial and 
substantial error which deprived it of a fair trial. Plaintiff 
has, therefore, also failed in overcoming the presumption of 
the verity of the judgment on the verdict. 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W.^Robert Wright 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & 
MCDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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